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Abstract
Existing literature on the City of London has tended to focus on its ‘structural
power’, while neglecting political and narrative agency. This paper acts as a cor-
rective by presenting evidence to show that since the financial crash of 2008 the
political terrain the City operates on has become more contested, crowded and
noisier. The contribution develops a middle course between a positive assessment
of the role of civil society in relation to global finance, and a more pessimistic
reading. We demonstrate how macro-narratives and public story-telling both con-
struct and contest City and financial sector power. In a new pattern since the
financial crash, NGOs have moved from campaigns of limited duration and
narrow focus, to a more sustained presence on macro-structural issues. Adopting
a supply–demand framework for assessing governance and regulatory change, we
look at the emergence of TheCityUK as a new advocacy arm and the strategies of
three of the more prominent and focused NGOs that have mobilized in the after-
math of the crash: the Tax Justice Network’s (TJN) use of the ‘finance curse’;
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Positive Money on private endogenous money creation; and Finance Watch coun-
terweight strategies at the level of the European Union. We suggest these mobil-
izations highlight the need for a more concerted and orchestrated construction of a
global institutional civil society infrastructure in finance (a global financial public
sphere) to achieve greater access, resources, scrutiny and oversight for a range of
specialist expert NGOs.
Keywords: City of London; structural power; macro-narratives; NGOs; noisy
politics; civil society.
The City of London has a feted, almost mythical status in contemporary British
public life as a source of economic dynamism and crucial wealth generation in
the global economy. But how the City organizes and constructs itself politically
to promote this message and its own interests has often been overlooked. Since
the financial crash, the City in conjunction with the British state has revamped
its promotional and advocacy activities. We juxtapose this with a gathering civil
society mobilization of organized political opposition to City power, activities
and practices, through a burgeoning range of NGO campaigns stimulated by
the financial crash. This paper explores these processes, by situating them in
a supply–demand framework for understanding transformatory regulatory
policy change, arguing that stirring noisy demand-side politics needs to trans-
late into an orchestrated overhaul of institutional supply-side politics if this
growing contestation is to have a meaningful outcome.
Existing literature on the City of London has tended to focus on its ‘struc-
tural power’ (Cain & Hopkins, 2000; Ingham, 1984; Johal et al., 2014; Talani,
2012).1 The political and narrative agency surrounding the politics of the
City has consequently not always received the attention it might (Bell & Hind-
moor, 2015). A literature on financial sector lobbying has demonstrated how the
financial industry executes political strategy by influencing specific pieces of
regulation and legislation, as well as limits to this capacity (Kastner, 2014;
Lall, 2012; Pagliari & Young, 2014, 2016; Young, 2013, 2012). Yet formal tar-
geted lobbying is only one element of financial sector power. Agents represent-
ing the City of London wield a multi-faceted form of power (Johal et al., 2014).
City agents have consciously formulated and promoted society-wide macro-nar-
ratives concerning the contribution of the financial sector to jobs, growth and
taxes, the necessity of global financial competitiveness, as well as the society-
wide benefits of financial innovation. This has had the effect of establishing a
broadly finance-friendly political arena domestically (in the United Kingdom)
and internationally (Baker, 2010; Engelen et al., 2011). The paper presents evi-
dence to show that since the financial crash of 2008 the political terrain the City
operates on has become more contested, crowded and noisier (Culpepper,
2010). We look at the emergence of both TheCityUK as a new advocacy arm
and the strategies of three of the more prominent and focused NGOs that
have mobilized in the aftermath of the crash: the Tax Justice Network (TJN)
and the use of the ‘finance curse’; Positive Money on private endogenous
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money creation; and Finance Watch counterweight strategies to produce more
‘socially useful’ finance at the level of the European Union. We conclude by
pointing to the need for an orchestrated construction of an international insti-
tutional civil society infrastructure in finance that achieves greater access, infor-
mation, scrutiny and oversight for a range of specialist expert NGOs.
Our contribution develops a middle course between a positive, optimistic
assessment of the role of civil society in relation to global finance (Germain,
2004, 2010), and a more negative assessment (Anheier, 2014; Scholte, 2013).
We also seek to fill a gap in the literature on City and financial sector power
by demonstrating the ways in which macro-narratives and public story-telling
both construct and contest City power. Patterns of intensifying NGO contesta-
tion of City power and claims matter for two reasons. First, far-reaching regu-
latory and governance change can be thought of as depending on supply and
demand elements (Mattli & Woods, 2009). According to Mattli and Woods’s
framework for understanding major regulatory and governance change in
global politics, challenging a status quo requires demand-side mobilization in
which the public at large, in conjunction with policy entrepreneurs, become
more interested in and make active demands of policy-makers and governance
and regulatory processes. It is here that macro-narratives on the appropriate
macro-economic contribution and organizational structures of finance have a
role in stimulating public interest and understandings, while also shaping pre-
ferences. If there are signs that public demand for change is stirring and being
stimulated by NGO alternative narratives, this should be of empirical interest to
researchers because it is evidence of mounting political pressure for change.
Second, growing NGO activism illustrates how the City is finding itself
under increasing public scrutiny, as a consequence of a growing realization
that many of its public arguments and claims ought to be regarded sceptically
and subjected to careful scrutiny. Nevertheless, NGO campaigns and
counter-narratives are unlikely to produce much substantive change unless
this emerging scepticism is more effectively institutionalized through the con-
struction of institutional supply-side mechanisms of due process that scrutinize
and debate financial sector power and proposals, involving higher burden-of-
proof thresholds for City arguments and narratives, internationally and domes-
tically. In this respect, a genuinely more democratic and inclusive global finan-
cial public sphere will require macro-narratives that build a case for
orchestrating a well-equipped NGO international institutional infrastructure.
The first section of the paper discusses the relevant literature. Section two
examines prevailing conceptions of City power and discusses the creation of
TheCityUK. The third section presents empirical findings based on six inter-
views and recurrent discussions with senior NGO campaign strategists, which
we treat as confidential. We also cite a confidential telephone interview with a
central banker. Our three cases are the Tax Justice Network (TJN), Positive
Money, and Finance Watch. A fourth concluding section argues that these
developments are indicative of a growing public appetite to debate and
rethink the role of finance in the economy as a whole and a growing NGO
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capacity to campaign on these issues. However, we also suggest these demand-
side pressures will amount to little if they are not harnessed to orchestrate a
more extensive institutional supply-side infrastructure.
Narratives, NGOs and a financial public sphere
Society-wide macro-narratives about the structures, practices and role of
finance in the economy have not been a major focus in either the literature
on the City, or financial sector power and lobbying. Yet given the centrality
attached to narratives and discourse in producing institutional and socio-
economic transformations, there are good reasons to believe this may be an over-
sight (Roe, 1994; Schmidt, 2010). The importance of narrative arises from
seeing people as needing stories to make sense of complex socio-economic pro-
cesses (Fisher, 1984; Seabrooke & Thomsen, 2016; Stanley & Jackson, 2016).
Where the role of the City is concerned, its complex range of activities and pro-
cesses, and their systemic implications, necessitate simplifying frames and
stories to make such processes and their effects intelligible to a wider audience.
In this respect, the use of language and narrative can be more than simply
descriptive, but can equally be creative in giving form to, and becoming consti-
tutive of, social reality (Cunliffe et al., 2004, p. 264). Assigning some ontological
primacy to language means focusing on how stories are told, attaching signifi-
cance to and investigating the tenor and tone of language and seeking to under-
stand how actors play language games and with what consequences (Haack et al.,
2012, p. 820). Macro-narratives become influential when they become ‘habitua-
lized discourse’, a recurrent application of a narrative in response to a problem
of societal concern, so that consensual collective societal beliefs are fostered and
consolidated. For example, in the first half of the 2000s, a combination of reg-
ulators, bankers, politicians and some academics both globally and in the United
Kingdom largely bought into two overlapping stories about the end of boom and
bust and the benefits of financialization. Such stories are best understood as
‘liturgies or often repeated forms of words that reassure and create a narrative
world’ (Froud et al., 2012, p. 43). Accordingly, evidence of an intensification
of narrative contestation of a prior ‘habitualized discourse’ can serve to challenge
and reconstruct social realities, eventually resulting in changed collective
societal beliefs. As Schmidt puts it, narratives establish how actors conceptualize
the world, but also enable them to reconceptualize the world serving as a
resource to promote change (Schmidt, 2010, p. 13; Widmaier et al., 2007).
In the field of finance, NGOs have become a significant source of counter-
narratives since the financial crash, making arguments for reorganization and
re-regulation of finance on a macro-scale, in ways that directly challenge the
power and centrality of the City. This is, however, only a relatively recent
phenomenon (since 2010). One recent contribution has noted that change-
oriented NGOs have remained in the shadows vis-à-vis private financial
markets and have failed to stimulate major consequential civil society drives
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for the reform and transformation of finance (Scholte, 2013, p. 2). A further
account talks of the ‘institutional void’ produced by the ‘evident paucity of
civil society institutions in the domain of finance’ (Anheier, 2014, p. 24.)
Historically, NGOs have been active on issues of low-income country debt,
particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s, most notably through the
Jubilee Debt Campaign. Similarly, the Bretton Woods Project based in
London launched a campaign in 1995 for institutional reform of the IMF
and the World Bank. Both the World Social Forum and the Occupy move-
ment have covered issues relating to global finance, but this has had a
rather fleeting quality in a more generalized critique of ‘neoliberalism’.
Other NGOs such as Oxfam and Friends of the Earth have drawn attention
to finance-driven land grabs in the Global South (Scholte, 2013). Crucially,
the general pattern has been one of small limited isolated campaigns of a
limited duration and focus, with little sustained presence on macro- or struc-
tural issues relating to the organization, norms, objectives and overall conse-
quences of the global financial industry. Scholte explains this by identifying
a number of obstacles NGOs face in the field of finance, including: limited
expertise; an uninformed and largely disinterested public; a lack of insti-
tutional access and direction; limited transparency; inadequate funding and
limited staffing patterns; a splintering of focus and limited co-ordination; a
limited willingness by the official community to engage; embedded social hier-
archies; the entrenched structural power of financial capital and its permeation
of nearly all elites; and dominant hegemonic constructions of ‘neoliberal’
knowledge (Scholte, 2013). Our research uncovers evidence to suggest that
this is starting to change, but also, given the above obstacles, that there are
merits in an orchestrated effort to directly construct and institutionalize a
global financial public sphere.
A more optimistic account of civil society potential has demonstrated how
transnational civil society networks successfully instigated international stan-
dards (albeit diluted) on consumer protection, through the constructing of a
narrative that linked the financial crash to consumers’ own adverse experiences
(Kastner, 2014, pp. 1335–1336). The most optimistic scenario of all has been
outlined in the work of Randall Germain in his notion of a financial public
sphere. Conceiving of a public sphere as an institutionalized arena of discourse
and dialogue where specific audiences can engage in social, political and cultural
criticism and forms of public reasoning (Bohman, 1998), Germain has argued
that features of a global financial public sphere are progressively being realized
(Germain, 2004, 2010). In Germain’s analysis three criteria – clear modes of
public reasoning, a plurality of participants and a growing critical reciprocity
between participants – were all being satisfied (Bohman, 1998, p. 144;
Germain, 2004, p. 233). Consequently, ‘a wide variety of agents that span the
world’s social hierarchies (political, economic and societal) are now involved
in contesting financial governance arrangements and may be taken as constitut-
ing, at least in part, a “public” sphere’ (Germain, 2010, p. 504). Others have
questioned this view because global institutions have not been particularly
Andrew Baker and Duncan Wigan: Constructing and contesting City of London
power 189
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Sh
eff
iel
d]
 at
 03
:32
 12
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
open, while empirical studies have shown that the plurality of participants and
the degree of critical reciprocity between them has been limited (Baker, 2009;
Lall, 2012).
One framework for studying change that seeks to identify the factors that can
constrain powerful corporate actors such as the City of London, and empower
counterpositions, specifies two determining conditions (Mattli & Woods, 2009).
The first is a demand side, involving an energized, interested and informed
public; and the second, an institutional supply side, based on participatory
mechanisms that are fair, transparent and open, including clear access points
and recurrent oversight and accountability mechanisms (Mattli & Woods,
2009, p. 4). This demand–supply framework suggests that moving from a situ-
ation of ‘narrow and limited demand’ (and interest) to ‘broad and sustained
demand’ is politically important (Mattli & Woods, 2009, p. 21). An energetic
mobilized public on the demand side need to interact with resourceful,
expert, well-organized and committed allies at various stages of reform:
agenda setting, policy negotiation, implementation, monitoring and enforce-
ment of new arrangements, through open, transparent and accessible insti-
tutional supply-side mechanisms (Mattli & Woods, 2009). In this respect a
typical criticism of NGOs is that they have been most effective in demonstrating
failures of existing practice and mobilizing support for change in agenda-setting
struggles, but have lacked resources to develop effective monitoring and enfor-
cement mechanisms (Mattli & Woods, 2009; Vogel, 2009). This alerts us to the
potential importance of a multi-level civil society with a division of labour
between co-ordinated NGOs, performing different niche roles, bringing differ-
ent forms of expertise and strategy to bear, and engaging publics and elites in
different ways.
Another way of considering demand-side issues is to think in terms of politi-
cal salience, or the distinction between quiet and noisy politics (Culpepper,
2010). Culpepper argues that political parties have few incentives to invest in
expertise and the promotion of reforms for as long as questions are of ‘low pol-
itical salience’. When voters are not attuned to an issue area, corporate lobbies
are expected to prevail. Culpepper contrasts this form of ‘quiet politics’ with
noisy politics, and tellingly asks what happens when political salience
becomes high and stays high (Culpepper, 2010, p. 145). When political salience
becomes high (noisy politics) Culpepper expects political parties once again to
become interested and important actors in a particular field. Corporate groups
will continue to be important actors under conditions of noisy politics, but they
will no longer monopolize influence as a consequence of their expertise, or the
deference politicians pay to it (weapons of quiet politics) (Culpepper, 2010,
p. 145). In this respect, noisy politics on the demand side can create an
impetus and opportunity formally to institutionalize greater degrees of scrutiny
on the supply side. Noisy politics is something NGOs can both respond to and
actively cultivate through campaigns and counter-narratives, in a dual effect,
but this will need political parties to respond by creating mechanisms that
give institutional expression to noisy politics.
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The city, structural power and the case of TheCityUK
Most accounts of the power of the City of London invoke some notion of struc-
tural power. For example, it has long been argued that the City can set the par-
ameters of economic policy in the United Kingdom, due to the centrality and
functions of the Treasury and the Bank of England, a generally sympathetic
governing philosophy amongst UK political elites, strong historical/cultural
relationships between those agencies and the City and the historical evolution
of British capitalism based on financial structural dominance (Bell & Hindmoor,
2014; Ingham, 1984; Longstreth, 1979, pp. 161–162; Talani, 2012, p. 19).
International projection of City preferences through the pursuit of UK
foreign economic policy has also been identified (Baker, 1999, 2010; Blank,
1977). The City itself can be understood as a geographically clustered insti-
tutional structure of commercial financial trading, advisory and intermediation
practices using ever more innovative techniques to deliver income and fees for
practitioners (Ingham, 1984, p. 60; Lysandrou et al., 2017; Talani, 2012, p. 26).
Scholars have subsequently drawn attention to the absence of coherent
coalitions of opposition to City economic preferences, in part due to financiali-
zation of other sectors of the economy and the population as whole, including
the disciplinary practices associated with this (Johal et al., 2014; Langley,
2008; Norfield, 2016; Talani, 2012, p. 21). But if financialization is something
of a fool’s gold as many critical scholars have argued (Engelen et al., 2011;
Froud et al., 2006; Johal et al., 2014; Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015;
Nesvetailova, 2015), that lack of opposition is not necessarily a permanent
feature of UK and global political economy. If the gains of financialization for
the majority of the United Kingdom and the world’s population are indeed illu-
sory, as this literature in part argues, articulation of the problems arising from
financialization through campaigning and clear communicative strategy could
effectively contest City power, and advance different understandings of how
the City and global finance should be governed and for what purpose. Noisy
public demands can result in political defeats for the City (Thompson, 2017).
In a context of hard Brexit, TheCityUK insiders have already been expressing
frustration at a seeming decline of influence in the political party sphere (Inter-
view with TJN campaigner, March 2017).
City power can be understood as having a multi-faceted character, with
different faces receding, advancing or combining in different conjunctures
(Johal et al., 2014). In their account, Johal et al. identify four faces of City
power: power over decision (lobbying); power over agenda control or non-
decision; hegemonic power (societal narrative); and capillary power – a form
of governmentality based on learned self-discipline. Their thesis is that from
the 1980s onwards the City relied on a combination of hegemonic narrative
and capillary power (the taught self-discipline of financialized citizens).
The narrative element of this emphasized UK manufacturing decline, creating
a necessity for London as a financial centre to create an alternative
economic dynamic and give the United Kingdom a competitive advantage as
Andrew Baker and Duncan Wigan: Constructing and contesting City of London
power 191
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Sh
eff
iel
d]
 at
 03
:32
 12
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
a post-industrial service sector with financial services in the City as the motor
(Johal et al., 2014, p. 412). This narrative also held that light-touch regulation
was a necessity because the City had to compete in a global context. In this
account, both narrative and capillary power are highlighted as part of an ulti-
mately unstable and unsustainable regime that lost legitimacy following the
crash of 2008, due to a series of recurring scandals, the evident failure of risk
management techniques, questionable claims about market efficiency and self-
automation and ultimately the failure of an experiment of governmentality
based around disciplined financial subjects that lacked basic financial literacy
(Johal et al., 2014, p. 404). Consequently, since the financial crash, with both
capillary and narrative power damaged, the City has turned to more overt use
of decision power and direct lobbying, despite long-term ambitions to avoid
this because it involves operating on public and sometimes democratic terrains
(Johal et al., 2014).2 While the City remains a formidable operator in the
decision-making arena, with considerable resources and expertise, the exercise
of decision power is more uncertain than either narrative or capillary power,
particularly as both narrative and decisional contestation are on the rise.
In the run up to the financial crash, the City’s own macro-narrative went
largely unchallenged. During the ‘great moderation’, the demand-side contesta-
tion of financial sector claims and the proposal of alternatives were muted,
restricted to isolated campaigns and did not produce countervailing public
macro-narratives about finance. Stories told about the great moderation were
endlessly repeated by politicians, regulators, financial market participants
and various financial commentators up to the summer of 2007 (Froud et al.,
2012, p. 43).
The narrative about the social value of finance was so potent because it served to
align the calculations of different elites (in markets, the core executive, and the
regulatory agencies), about the benefits of financial innovation, and because it
was congruent with the historically engrained culture of consensus amongst
(old and new) metropolitan elites. (Engelen et al., 2011, p. 144)
We would add to this that the absence of society-wide countervailing opposi-
tional narratives was a key condition in producing the ascendancy of City
story-telling.
In a possible pre-emptive anticipation of a more contested public and a
noisier form of politics emerging following the financial crash, a number of
City representatives together with HM Treasury moved to establish TheCi-
tyUK as a specific umbrella City advocacy agent in 2009–2010. While the
British Bankers Association (BBA) had been in operation since 1919, along
with several other industry associations, no body spoke for the City as a
whole. The so-called Bischoff Report, a joint HM Treasury–City report,
chaired by Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling in 2009, sought to
put this right by calling for a rationalization of existing City promotional activi-
ties, with the creation of TheCityUK being the outcome. TheCityUK’s primary
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mission is to work ‘to demonstrate the importance of the UK financial services
industry to a broader British audience and to market the City’s strengths over-
seas’, consolidating and deepening the City’s role as the primary European and
global financial and professional services hub (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 50). The
report argued that the multiplicity of bodies explaining aspects of the City’s
work sometimes caused confusion, overlap and duplication, creating a need
for more coherence and greater promotional effectiveness. ‘A fresh approach,
strengthening the quality of promotional work for UK based international
financial services’, based on ‘a single body as a home for all public and
private promotional resources’, was called for (HMTreasury, 2009, p. 49). The-
CityUK was to be a practitioner-led independent strategic body, but with a
formal link to HM Treasury’s own high-level strategy group (HLG).
What is particularly interesting about the TheCityUK initiative, therefore, is
not just that it was to become the primary national and international City advo-
cacy agent, but that this was being directed, organized, co-ordinated and
encouraged by a state agency as a matter of strategic national importance. More-
over, the state itself was to play a role in TheCityUK, while TheCityUK would
have direct access into the highest levels of the Treasury. In this way the British
state was displaying an active interest in shaping the organizational and advocacy
structures of a key industry, ensuring the City had a coherent analytical arm and
public policy voice that was structurally entwined with the most senior levels of
British economic policy-making. While the City’s relations with the Bank of
England have become more strained since the financial crash due to the
Bank’s own regulatory activism, the creation of TheCityUK represented an
effort to create a more coherent, strategic and focused City–Treasury nexus,
which would sit at the heart of British development strategy and economic
policy-making. In this sense it was a more effective institutionalization of a
long-standing but often unspoken British industrial policy of promoting the
City as a strategic industry of national importance. The move also illustrated
that, on the institutional supply side, UK financial and regulatory policy-
making is not an open transparent process, based on equal multiple access
points, but closer to a highly asymmetrical one based on a significant degree
of intertwinement between the core executive and the City.
Since its inception six years ago TheCityUK has evolved into a co-ordinated
organizational infrastructure for promoting British financial services both
nationally and internationally, in multiple ways. Both its board of directors
(with 18 members) and its advisory council (with 78 members) read as a
Who’s Who from the City’s transnational firms and organizations such as the
City of London Corporation and the BBA. In City circles it is now widely con-
sidered to be the City’s most important and powerful lobbying organization.
TheCityUK is now the central co-ordinating mechanism for the City’s vast lob-
bying and intellectual resources. It has a well-resourced specialist committee
structure consisting of five primary committees: an economist group of
leading City economists to examine how macro-economic issues affect the
financial industry; an international regulatory strategy group to engage
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governments, regulators and international organizations, and identify research
programmes with representatives from HM Treasury, the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office (FCO) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); a
trade and investment group focused on ‘breaking down market access barriers’
of a tax and regulatory nature; a public affairs group to maintain relations with
governments and regulators by holding revolving seminars with governments,
political parties and regulators in the United Kingdom and the European
Union; and a Liberalization of Trade in Services Committee focused on
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) issues, which
includes a mix of City notables and staff and British government and regulatory
officials. In addition, TheCityUK has a number of industry, sector and country
advisory groups, covering areas such as insurance, asset management, infra-
structure and energy, Islamic finance, legal services and major emerging
markets. In short, the response of both the British government and the City
to the financial crash was to professionalize and strategically focus the political,
organizational, public communication, research and lobbying capacity of the
City into a formidable, streamlined and co-ordinated apparatus, while strength-
ening the linkages with the central British state. The move came at precisely the
moment when the City’s public standing and legitimacy was at an all-time low in
modern times, and was a deliberate effort to bolster political organizational
capacity and access to government.
The core macro-narrative propagated by TheCityUK invokes a ‘City is indis-
pensable’ message consisting of six key claims that feature regularly in TheCi-
tyUK reports and press releases. These include: a tax contribution claim that
puts the total contribution of financial services at £63 billion, 11.6 per cent of
total tax receipts in 2011/2012, making it the largest contribution of any
sector (TheCityUK, 2013); a jobs contribution claim, with financial services
said to be responsible for generating 2.05 million jobs, 7.2 per cent of total
UK employment; a growth GDP claim that UK financial and professional ser-
vices contribute £194 billion to the UK economy, accounting for 14.5 per cent
of economic output (TheCityUK, 2013); a regional benefits claim citing 1.4
million jobs being created outside of London by City activities, with London
subsidizing all UK regions in fiscal deficit and exporting money to the tune
of £17 billion over the decade to 2008–2009; an efficiency claim that large finan-
cial sectors produce liquidity and smooth the circulation and flow of capital
around the global economy, putting it to its most effective and efficient use;
and a trade surplus current account contribution claiming that financial organ-
izations contributed £47.2 billion in 2011, representing 3 per cent of GDP,
making the financial services contribution larger than the combined surplus
of all other net exporting industries in the United Kingdom. TheCityUK’s will-
ingness to put bold but contestable and simple figures on many of its claims has
produced an active powerful narrative of indispensability that still has traction
after the financial crash, particularly with political parties, although senior
figures privately report growing frustration at their declining influence in the
party arena, post-Brexit. Moreover, the indispensability claim is being
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increasingly contested, partly by a number of experts, but also by wider cam-
paigning groups and NGOs who are building alternative public narratives.
This process began to gain momentum from 2010 onwards.
NGO mobilization and contestation of City power since the
financial crash
One of the largely overlooked effects of the financial crash of 2008 has been the
mobilization of a range of NGOs who seek directly to contest what they see as
the excessive power and privileged position of the financial sector, including the
City of London, by advancing macro-narratives about the structural inadequa-
cies and harmful effects of contemporary financial structures and practices. In
each of the three cases we consider, 2010 is the crucial start date for this
more activist approach. In each case, the NGO in question responded to politi-
cal demands and public moods, albeit in different ways, while seeking further to
stimulate, inform and shape general public sentiment on questions of finance
and its organization. Among the groups we do not directly consider here, but
that are certainly part of a similar phenomenon, are: Americans for Financial
Reform, a cross-cutting coalition of civil rights, consumer, labour, business,
investor, faith-based and civic and community groups formed in the wake of
the 2008 crash that has had some limited successes on consumer protection
regulation, but has little in the way of an overarching narrative; New Rules
for Global Finance, which tracks and seeks to call to account global financial
governance processes, including the Financial Stability Board, the G20 and
the IMF; and the US advocacy group the Systemic Risk Council, a group of
former regulatory professionals and officials who have the stated objective of
bringing their expertise to bear to ensure that post-crash financial regulatory
reform efforts do not lag (Noonan & McLannahan, 2015). The three NGOs
we focus on in more detail here all directly contest City power in more
focused ways.
The TJN and the ‘finance curse’ narrative
The Tax Justice Network (TJN) is best known for running successful
campaigns on tax issues, including putting country-by-country reporting and
automatic information exchange on the agenda of the OECD, the G20 and
the European Union, and publishing a financial secrecy index that changed per-
ceptions of financial transparency worldwide (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2015).
However, senior figures in the TJN have long been interested in building
public narratives that offer a more comprehensive critical assessment of financial
globalization. Tax was regarded as ‘an effective insertion point for contesting
contemporary financial practices as the most conspicuous Achilles heel in the
neoliberal policy armoury’ (Interview, two TJN members, February 2016).
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From 2010 onwards the TJN began promoting a diagnostic narrative, the
‘finance curse’, drawn from development literatures which highlighted poor
economic performance in mineral-rich countries, the ‘resource curse’ (Karl,
1997; Ross, 1999). The key document outlining the finance curse concept
was published as an 89-page e-book on the TJN’s website in 2013 (as well as
a later piece in an academic political science journal) (Christensen & Shaxson,
2013; Christensen et al., 2016). The e-book systematically presents evidence
in an effort to illustrate many of the symptoms that countries with large offshore
global financial centres display and share with resource curse countries.
The basic message of the finance curse narrative is that finance can become
too big and too powerful with deleterious social and economic consequences,
and that too much finance and too much dependence on it is not necessarily
good for a country’s economy as a whole. This is not a new observation in
the UK case due to an extensive literature on the role of finance capital in
British decline (Coates, 1999; Gamble, 1985; Glyn, 2007; Ingham, 1984;
Kennedy, 1987; Shonfield, 1958). What is new is the simultaneous packaging
of the finance curse as a dynamic process displaying similar traits to the resource
curse, a populist, political narrative and a conceptual apparatus/research
agenda. It is this combination that makes it potentially potent.
Through the use of a finance curse narrative, TJN explicitly sets out to
contest the narrative of ‘the City is indispensable’, systematically working
through TheCityUK tax, jobs, growth, regional and balance of trade arguments
and disputing each one in terms of numbers, highlighting and quantifying the
costs of many financial activities to tax, growth, competitiveness and jobs in
other sectors (Christensen & Shaxson, 2013). This is a long-standing TJN
tactic of telling alternative stories that seek to ‘flip’ dominant narratives, by pre-
senting a reverse image (Confidential interview, two TJN members, February
2016). The aim of the finance curse narrative is to reconfigure the terms of
the public debate about finance and the role of the City, and alter the political
and cognitive terrain on which public discourse about finance and the City is
constructed.
The finance curse concept draws attention to six prominent dynamic symp-
toms that are frequently missed in conventional economic data and crude aggre-
gations thereof. (i) ‘Dutch disease’ is where financial sector growth raises local
prices, particularly the exchange rate (and, in London, property prices), making
it harder for alternative tradeable sectors to compete in world markets. (ii) Brain
drain sees higher salaries in finance suck the most skilled and educated people
away from other sectors. In the UK context, the Bank of England’s chief econ-
omist Andy Haldane has made similar claims referring to a ‘vacuum cleaner
effect’ in which the financial sector sucks in both financial and human capital
(Haldane, 2012, p. 4). (iii) ‘Financialization’ means that financial activities
take precedence and start to damage genuine productive activities, generating
their own endogenous growth including money creation, rent extraction and
enormous systemic risks and macro-economic costs. In this respect, research
at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has indicated that once bank
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assets start to exceed annual GDP in size they start to act as a drag on growth
(Checchetti & Kharroubi, 2012). This notion is integral to the concept of the
finance curse because the core claim is that above a certain level and size
finance starts to become harmful to wider economic performance, by combining
with Dutch disease and brain drain to produce a ‘crowding-out effect’. (iv)
Uneven geographical and spatial development occurs when major global finan-
cial service centres concentrate resources, activities, investment and people in an
urban hub at the expense of underdevelopment and neglect elsewhere. This in
turn leads to arguments that the City’s operations entail the metropolitanization
of gains and the nationalization of losses (Leaver, 2013). (v) Rising inequality
and social stratification sees a small metropolitan elite accumulates vast
resources, inflating asset and property bubbles, producing financial instability
and making asset ownership difficult for large sections of the population (Gal-
braith, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Rajan, 2010). (vi) Political capture occurs where the
financial sector becomes disproportionately influential in politics as state
resources, policies and institutions are directed towards financial promotion,
weakening alternative sectors and creating disincentives for government officials
to take corrective action due to easy rents (Baker, 2010; Christensen & Shaxson,
2013; Johnson & Kwak, 2010). These six features of course divide nicely into a
series of more detailed research programmes. In December 2016, the TJN
secured five years of research funding from the Ford Foundation to work
with academics to pursue research in each of these streams and add rigour to
the narrative’s constituent claims. From the TJN perspective developing the
finance curse analysis and gaining political traction for the narrative is seen as
a 10-year undertaking and the central plank of the TJN’s work for the next
decade, the importance of which is intensified by Brexit (Confidential interview,
senior TJN figure, October 2016).
This sixth symptom of capture is central to the analysis and purpose of the
finance curse as the objective is to challenge the political dominance of the
City in the United Kingdom, as well as something that can be used internation-
ally by other states. The TJN intention is to use the narrative to build a powerful
cross-cutting oppositional coalition of technocrats, regulators, disillusioned
former industry voices, academics, trade unionists, NGOs, start-up venture
capital small and medium enterprises (SMEs), members of the public and even-
tually parliamentarians. As the brief summary above indicated, the finance curse
concept draws on strands of research from some of the world’s most eminent
technocrats and policy economists. In this sense, although it is intended to
act as a populist slogan and rallying call, it also acts as a unifying umbrella
concept for many of the individual symptoms identified in detailed technical
financial research. Again, this is a fairly typical TJN tactic, in which authorita-
tive expertise, knowledge and data are harnessed to build authoritative narra-
tives and policy templates that can effectively be subcontracted to others for
deployment in different contexts (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2015). This has
enabled the TJN in the past to exert a disproportionate influence as a low-
budget, small-staff operation in technical fields such as corporate tax populated
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by vast corporate lobbies with deep resources (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2015). Nar-
rating is a core strategy for ‘a fast, flexible, expert-led, activist think tank’ and
involves providing consistent storylines that give actionable alternatives (Seab-
rooke & Wigan, 2015). These language games have become an increasingly
important mode of operation for the TJN, with a growing number of staff
trained journalists for precisely this reason. The finance curse is an element
of this approach and was chosen as the umbrella concept, because ‘it does
what it says on the tin. Simplicity is a strength. We wanted something that
could fit on a placard’ (Interview, two TJN members, November 2015).
While work in comparative and international political economy has high-
lighted how ideas make coalition building and collective action possible
(Blyth, 2002; Widmaier et al., 2007), the processes of active public narrating
to make ideas and analysis intelligible to the public at large have received rela-
tively little attention.3 Public narration involves the creation of persuasive
stories and imagery that are plausible and recognizable to large sections of the
population. This can in turn create demand-side pressures and noisier politics
in an issue area, intensifying the scrutiny of the behaviours and claims of par-
ticular sectors, increasing public scepticism and demands for increased regulat-
ory and governance oversight and even structural overhaul. It is in this context
that the potential potency of the finance curse narrative should be understood.
Our aim here is not to demonstrate the influence the finance curse narrative has
had. The TJN are after all only at the beginning of what they see as a 10-year
process. Rather our concern is to draw attention to the emergence of this nar-
rative campaign, while asking what the implications of the finance curse gaining
political traction might be. A more negative, and jaundiced, popular reading of
financialization brought about by widespread public usage and recognition of
the finance curse narrative will create not only greater public and political scep-
ticism towards the City’s own claims but also demand-side pressures for greater
oversight and scrutiny in the field of financial governance. This in turn creates
potential rationales and pressures for cultivating an institutional supply-side
infrastructure capable of delivering that enhanced scrutiny. Of course, the
United Kingdom moved in exactly the opposite direction following the financial
crash, bolstering City advocacy through the creation of TheCityUK. The TJN
reading is that this is precisely why a finance curse narrative is urgently needed,
further enhanced by Brexit and fears of a regulatory race to the bottom to
protect the City’s status at all costs (Interview, senior TJN figure, October
2016, January 2017).
As well as providing a clear, intelligible narrative, the finance curse also has
interesting political arithmetic. In a UK context it speaks to the concerns of the
country outside London, in relation to brain drain, crowding out and uneven
development symptoms, as well as many within the capital hit by growing prop-
erty prices inflated by astronomical City salaries and wealth flows. It also has
appeal to commercial coalitions concerned with longer-term investment. For
example, TJN have launched a well-received road show of public events in
London, Bournemouth, Southampton, Burton on Trent and Bradford to a
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mix of audiences including community organizations, ex-financiers and aca-
demics, with little or no ‘push back’. The finance curse also has sympathizers
in surprising places, including at the Bank of England, but also a team of
four to five journalists working on the Financial Times capital markets desk
(Interview, senior TJN figures, January 2017; Caulkin, 2016).
Finance curse symptoms and the City’s role in generating them internation-
ally have also been noted outside of the United Kingdom. Symptomatic is the
observation of New York Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney at a
House Financial Services Committee ‘that every big trading disaster happens
in London’. Gary Gensler, former chairperson of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, has also spoken about how London trading activities
have detrimentally affected US commerce (Gensler, 2013). The broader
point here is that displeasure with UK financial practices and presence has
grown amongst US elites, and noisier politics surrounding the City has potential
internationally, as well as domestic dimensions. If the United Kingdom’s inter-
national reputation as a systemic risk super spreader grows, particularly in a
context of an increasingly internationally salient finance curse narrative, the
United Kingdom can be expected to come under growing international pressure
to govern the City more effectively. This could be fuelled by a geopolitical
climate of growing EU hostility, in a context of acrimonious Brexit negotiations
and an unpredictable but nationalistic and protectionist President Trump in the
White House. Moreover, critical academic voices in the United States have
identified the costs of their own oversized financial sector, with Gerard
Epstein most notably arguing that the financial system will impose an excess
cost on the US economy of over $22.7 trillion from 1990 up to 2023 (Epstein
& Montecino, 2016). TJN staff view this as part of the evidence base that the
finance curse is a global phenomenon blighting both developed and developing
worlds. They also take a view that the finance curse can provide a diagnostic for
some of the United States’ own economic problems, which can in turn increase
US pressure on British authorities for greater oversight of the City. The current
TJN intention is to promote the finance curse narrative to US audiences, as well
as to a wider range of international NGOs, as part of the TJN’s strategy of sub-
contracting concepts (Interview, senior TJN figure, October 2016).
A recognition of the validity of the finance curse also necessitates greater vig-
ilance to curb its symptoms. It therefore contains a rationale for creating an
active institutionalized sphere of experts and organizations capable of scrutiniz-
ing and contesting financial sector power claims and narratives as a point of
principle. Despite this, the size of the task facing the TJN is illustrated by
the fact that the least responsive group are senior politicians from mainstream
UK parties, due to a deeply engrained City indispensability mentality. Fear
and reluctance to talk about the City means that noisier politics is yet to make
the crucial breakthrough into the party-political arena (Interview, two TJN
members, November 2015). Recent TJN policy discussions with Shadow Chan-
cellor John McDonnell have been characterized by a willingness to talk about
revenue-raising measures, but a reluctance to consider behavioural and
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regulatory issues (Interview, senior TJN figure, January 2017). Without traction
in the party-political arena as the ultimate test of noisy politics (Culpepper,
2010), the capacity to build the kind of financial public sphere capable of sub-
jecting finance and the City to sceptical scrutiny will likely remain limited.
Public, media and technocratic interest in the concept is, however, rising, and
TJN are planning a decade-long international campaign.
Positive Money
If the TJN’s effort to promote a new macro-financial narrative, and to get a com-
bination of experts, journalists and the public to coalesce around it, was an iso-
lated instance it would barely warrant further attention. However, it is part of a
broader phenomenon of NGO activism, noisy politics and public demand and
appetite for alternative narratives stimulated by the financial crash and the
search for intelligible stories that illuminate the problems of existing structures.
Evidence of this deeper public mood is provided by the case of Positive Money.
Positive Money offers a critique of a system of private money creation by
licensed banks and other financial institutions. It calls for the creation of an
independent, arms-length technical public body to perform this important
function directing money creation to ‘real economy’ activities, particularly
environmental investments. This member-based movement has eight full
time staff and a network of activists consisting of 28 local groups throughout
all parts of the United Kingdom, organizing events to raise public awareness
about the nature of private money creation. Sister organizations in 23 countries
across four continents share a similar analysis. Positive Money argues that 97
per cent of money is created by private banks, most of it electronically, and
only 3 per cent by governments. It sees this as entrusting excessive power to
private agents and City institutions, which has in turn generated excessive
debt and financial instability, but has not served society as a whole well. The
case for creating what Positive Money calls a sovereign monetary system is
further outlined in ‘Positive Money’ (Dyson et al., 2016a), with such intellectual
influences cited as Jackson & Dyson (2013), Werner (2011), the work of Irving
Fisher and Huber and Robertson (2000). Friends Provident and the Joseph Rown-
tree Foundation have provided financing, with another 40–50 per cent coming from
member donations. Positive Money is in this sense a genuine social movement but
one based on analysis drawn from a body of intellectual and academic work, which
seeks to build public support for public money creation.
Positive Money has had its credibility called into question by heterodox post-
Keynesian economists for paying too little attention to the financing needs of
capitalist economies, displaying ‘an inherent deflationary bias’ with ‘monetarist
overtones’, potentially limiting the stabilization role of fiscal policy by contribut-
ing to a form of monetary policy dominance and focusing too much on commer-
cial banks at the expense of non-banking institutions and shadow banks
(Fontana & Sawyer, 2016). Positive Money has written its own response
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(Dyson et al., 2016b) and engaged with a variety of experts and authorities in
outlining its position. The advisory board has a heavy academic complexion
including: Victoria Chick, renowned scholar of Keynes and monetary econ-
omics; Herman Daly, an ecological economist who formerly worked for the
World Bank; Joseph Huber, an economic sociologist who has written on envir-
onmentally informed monetary reform; Richard Werner, a former economist at
a City finance house and professor of international banking at Southampton; a
range of former financiers and regulators and business people as well as individ-
uals from the Bank of England, RBS, Lloyds Banking Group, the BBC and the
IMF, who prefer to remain anonymous. While shifting from a system of frac-
tional reserve banking to full reserve banking any time soon is deeply unrealistic,
that Positive Money has stirred public interest in and greater public debate on
monetary and financial structures is symptomatic of a growing thirst for knowl-
edge of alternatives. As one Bank of England official reflected in discussions
with Positive Money members, ‘it is incredible that the wider international
movement you are part of have managed to get hundreds of thousands of
people worldwide talking about monetary policy’ (Confidential interview, two
Positive Money members, November 2016).
Positive Money claims to have shaped the tone, tenor and terrain of debates
about quantitative easing (QE), particularly proposals for forms of people’s or
green QE, either as a means of creating funding for an investment bank, or heli-
copter money (Interview, senior Positive Money figure, December 2015). Adair
Turner, while sceptical of the ultimate Positive Money prescription, takes the
view that the movement has forced open a debate about the appropriate pro-
portions of money creation, raising the possibility of greater degrees of public
money creation and a case for overt monetary financing (Interview, senior Posi-
tive Money figure, December 2015; Turner, 2015). Positive Money claims its
most tangible influence to date has been stimulating the Bank of England to
write about private money creation (Interview, senior Positive Money
figure, December 2015; McLeay et al., 2014). It orchestrated a mass public
letter-writing campaign to the Bank of England from members and believes
this provoked the publication of a Bank Quarterly Bulletin paper that contained
an historical first central bank public admission about the nature of money cre-
ation by licensed private banks (Interview, senior Positive Money figure,
December 2015; McLeay et al., 2014; Tily, 2016). Positive Money has also
had supportive discussions with a number of Bank of England officials ‘inter-
ested’ in its ideas, with the identity of those officials remaining closely
guarded, and it also reports positive discussions with the research department
of the IMF and some staff at the BIS (Interview, senior Positive Money
figure, December 2015). These are important developments because, irrespec-
tive of whether the prescription of full reserve banking is credible, they are
indicative of noisier, more crowded politics in the sphere of financial and mon-
etary governance. Positive Money narratives certainly represent and stoke
increased levels of public scepticism about existing financial behaviours, struc-
tures and practices. In this sense, both the TJN finance curse campaign and the
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emergence of Positive Money are symptomatic and constitutive of this deeper
phenomenon of noisier demand-side politics. However, like the TJN, Positive
Money has also found the least responsive group to be politicians because of
short-term horizons, a taste for topical issues and a difficulty with long-term
thinking (Interview, senior figure, Positive Money, December 2015). For the
time being, the British party-political arena has remained insulated and
immune to gathering demand-side campaigns.
Finance Watch
Our final case reverses many of the patterns noted above in the two other cases,
and emphasizes the importance of developing a multi-layered civil society,
characterized by a co-ordinated division of labour between different specialist
NGOs, with different capacities and expertise. Finance Watch was in the first
instance an initiative of MEPs in the European Parliament, reflecting a wish
to establish a counterweight to financial sector lobbying and expertise.
Finance Watch was effectively an orchestrated attempt by European parliamen-
tarians to increase the pluralism surrounding the formulation of financial legis-
lation and regulation in the European Union. In this sense, while the British
state responded to the crash by orchestrating a consolidated and strengthened
City lobbying capacity, MEPs have moved in the opposite direction, seeking
to establish a counterweight to this enhanced capacity. As with the other two
cases, Finance Watch began to emerge in 2010, at the instigation of a cross-
party group of 22 MEPs, in response to a perceived political and undemocratic
imbalance that was skewing financial legislation. Finance Watch has since
received funding through a 1 million euro EU grant and charitable donations
from member organizations. There is now a permanent expert secretariat and
Brussels-based offices. Many senior Finance Watch personnel (like at the
TJN) are disillusioned former financial sector employees who now work to
hold their former industry to account.
The overall stated objective of Finance Watch is to ensure finance is brought
to productive uses, without causing detriment to society as whole. The organ-
izational motto is ‘making finance serve society’ based on ‘investment not
betting’. The aim is banking systems that direct finance into productive uses
without extracting economic rents or transferring risks to society, thus encoura-
ging long-term investment rather than ‘harmful speculation’. Despite these
grand pronouncements and guiding principles, Finance Watch makes much
less use of the narrative construction favoured by Positive Money and the
TJN. Stated objectives include: reducing the overall level of financialization;
reducing the costs of intermediation; limiting excessive speculation, commodity
speculation and high-frequency trading; channelling savings into sustainable
long-term investments; protecting the interests of the general public and con-
sumers. Finance Watch sees itself as a hybrid between a think tank and an
association of members, or a trade association (Interview, Finance Watch staff
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member, June 2016). It operates as a detailed expert arm representing a wider
network of member NGOs (for example, Oxfam), acting as a hub of expertise,
an information clearing house and specialist resource centre for those members.
A particular focus for Finance Watch is increasing the 3 per cent of deposits in
the European banking system that is used to fund business loans, by shaping
precise legislative clauses and regulatory adjustments through a form of attri-
tional legislative keyhole surgery (Interview, Finance Watch staff member,
June 2016). The down-side of this is that Finance Watch has focused on a
series of short- to medium-term battles, but has had more difficulty identifying
longer-term priorities and vision (Interview, Finance Watch staff member, June
2016).
Finance Watch staff think that their counter-lobbying has produced some
notable victories, given their relatively small budget and total financial expendi-
ture of 8 million euro (Confidential interview, Finance Watch staff member,
June 2016). Four main areas where legislation and regulation look different
due to Finance Watch arguments and presence can be identified. First, in the
area of consumer protection Finance Watch argued for the introduction of com-
prehension alerts in the key information document given to consumers prior to
purchase of a financial product. These now have to contain a warning if a
product contains complex features associated with previous mis-selling, as
well as clearer information on adviser fees and on the social and environmental
implications of certain products. Such requirements were inserted into the draft
Packaged Retail Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs) legislation.
Second, mandatory position limits restricting the amount of speculation
allowed on food commodity markets were inserted into the revision of
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) in 2012–2013,
through the tick-size regime limiting excessive forms of micro-arbitrage under-
taken by high-frequency traders. Such a move requires continuous monitoring,
so since 2014 Finance Watch has been monitoring the calibration of limits, pres-
suring MEPs and building a coalition in the Parliament to pressure the Com-
mission to tighten rules further. Third, Finance Watch argued for a 33 per
cent reduction in the risk weighting to loans to SMEs, to stimulate real
economy lending, with MEPs eventually agreeing to apply a 24 per cent
reduction, with this affecting the implementation of Basel III in the European
Union (Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning, 2015). Fourth, Finance Watch has
pressured for the extension of the Commission’s January 2014 proposal on secu-
rities financing transactions to move beyond transparency and include haircuts
and repurchase limits on such transactions, reflecting the Financial Stability
Board’s (FSB) recommendations in October 2014. In this particular instance,
the Commission decided to wait until FSB positions had been developed in
more detail, and included a provision that they would consider haircuts and
repurchase limits in 21 months’ time.
These four instances illustrate the importance of contesting financial decision
power, but also the enormity of the task and the need for NGOs to build further
capacity. Scrutinizing and developing evidence-based proposals on legislation
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and regulation requires enormous amounts of time and resources. Such activity
is a never ending task that requires specialist, focused, well equipped and well-
staffed organizations to provide an effective counter-balance to industry lobbies,
given how focused, well-connected and well-resourced bodies such as TheCi-
tyUK are. Indicative of the problem is that financial lobbyists see the successes
of Finance Watch as a lucrative business opportunity, with successes leading to
an increase in client fees to unwind Finance Watch achievements (Interview,
Finance Watch staff member, June 2016). Finance Watch personnel
acknowledge that they have stimulated an intensification of industry efforts
and expenditure, with some estimates suggesting that the industry has trebled
its Brussels-based lobbying expenditure to the tune of an additional 20
million euro in response to the existence of Finance Watch (Interview,
Finance Watch staff member, June 2016). This picture is compounded by
recent studies that show non-business respondents such as trade unions,
consumer protection groups, research institutes and NGOs represent less
than 6 per cent of the overall responses received by policy-makers around finan-
cial regulatory policies on aggregate (Pagliari & Young, 2016), while globally
only 2.5 per cent of International Non Governmental Organizations are con-
cerned with the financial sector, relative to 4.4 per cent with health, and 10
per cent education (Anheier, 2014, p. 30). Such data indicate that the global
financial public sphere remains underdeveloped and only thinly pluralist,
suggesting the kind of decisional contestation undertaken by Finance Watch
should be expanded, possibly through endowment foundation funding
(Anheier, 2014, p. 33). In this respect, narrative contestation has a vital role
to play in highlighting the wider deleterious social and economic consequences
of some financial activities, and thereby creating recognition of the potential
wider societal benefits of constructing an adequately resourced and equipped
NGO infrastructure to campaign on macro-financial issues. Policy-makers, as
in the case of MEPs, could also respond to such narratives by actively support-
ing and orchestrating initiatives such as Finance Watch to act as a precautionary
counterweight. Indeed, the case for the creation of versions of Finance Watch in
the United Kingdom is arguably strengthened by Brexit.
Conclusions: institutional supply-side reform and capacity building
Structural power is a major part of how the City of London constitutes and sus-
tains itself. The many existing rich and valuable accounts of this have, however,
often come at the expense of accounts of how political agency can both construct
and contest City power. This paper has sought to partially rectify that. First, by
showing how Treasury and City notables instigated a rationalization and
strengthening of City promotional agency in the creation of a new body, The-
CityUK, strengthening the City–Treasury nexus, as a direct response to the
financial crash. Second, by demonstrating that there has been an intensification
of narrative and decisional contestation by NGOs on macro-financial questions
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since the financial crash and arguing this phenomenon represents noisier
demand-side politics. To be meaningful, however, noisier demand-side politics
will require a more extensive institutional supply-side response. This would
mean a concerted effort to orchestrate, fund and build the capacity of expert
NGOs capable of subjecting the financial sector and its lobbies to closer scrutiny
and oversight, as well as enhancing access to key decision-making processes
globally and nationally. The financial crash and its vast economic and social
costs provide a rationale and impetus for such a process, but creating the necess-
ary public and political mood to sustain it will depend on the degree of accep-
tance for longer-term narratives like the finance curse. In this vein, a range of
NGOs have been coming together since 2013 in a ‘transforming finance’ initiat-
ive to build ideas on what such transformation might involve, including The
Finance Innovation Lab, ShareAction, Positive Money, New Economics Foun-
dation, Finance Watch, Move Your Money, Robin Hood Tax Campaign,
Oxfam UK, Friends of the Earth and Community Investment Coalition4.
The construction of a denser more tightly organized and co-ordinated multi-
level global financial public sphere could aim to ensure that finance curse symp-
toms are minimized, irrespective of whether we accept the veracity of all of the
concept’s individual claims.
The complexity of the field of global finance means that creating such an
infrastructure would likely require the creation of ‘thousands of structural
folds’ (multiple insider networks that cross policy domains and professional
boundaries) as part of a ‘social engineering project’ that in turn would require
substantial investment in organizations and people (Anheier, 2014, p. 35).
Such a process would require creating ties between those with expertise in
global finance and other fields and domains, so that the influence of global finan-
cial practices are more keenly understood and contested by wider coalitions of
activists and experts. Finance Watch’s capacity to make arguments calling for
limits to be placed on commodity speculation, which chimed with Oxfam’s con-
cerns about development, provides an example of the kind of linking processes
that are already underway, but that would need to be cultivated, multiplied and
extended. In this respect, the three NGOs we have considered here are more
specialist NGOs that effectively offer products such as expertise, ideas or nar-
ratives on finance to broader groups of campaigning NGOs whose primary
focus is not finance.
In Finance Watch’s case it has enjoyed privileged institutional access pre-
cisely because the European Parliament and the Commission played a role in
creating the organization. Such proactive initiatives could usefully become a
model for other regulatory and legislative jurisdictions in the quest for
greater institutional supply-side pluralism in the domain of finance. While
Finance Watch is a useful initiative, Finance Watch officials already complain
they cannot cope with demands and cover everything, not least because of
their limited resources relative to the industry. However, early evidence
suggests such counterweights can help to generate more socially useful regu-
lation and governance. Creating many more specialized and focused versions
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of Finance Watch might therefore be desirable, but, for that to be politically feas-
ible and appealing, narratives such as the finance curse will need to achieve greater
degrees of political prominence and acceptance. With the institutional supply side
in the United Kingdom remaining heavily skewed towards City access, one of the
most important impacts that narratives such as the finance curse could aim for is to
motivate a wholesale construction of a precautionary NGO institutional infrastruc-
ture in the domain of finance, nationally and globally, as the basis for a more plur-
alistic and inclusive financial public sphere.
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